Da hegemonia a uma conjuntura de crise política (1929- 1932): a participação paulista
Abstract
The First Republic (1889-1930) is known for the existence of federalism, the domain of the state Republican Parties, and the economy focused on the production of coffee, the major export of the country until the Great Depression of 1929, which changed the dynamics the world economy. Policy frameworks in the last decade of the regime society, 1920's, there were major social disruption discharging in an untenable situation, resulting in a transformation of the political system after the victory of Julio Prestes. His candidacy, chosen by Washington Luís, and subsequently his election victory, to the disgust of mineira policy elite, gaucha and state oppositions. This disagreement was crucial to system fragmentation point, generating a new political organization in Brazil, entirely different from the republican period, based on an administrative centralization around the Union Therefore, this present study aims to study the role, mainly actors political São Paulo, the events related to the 1930 Revolution, and how it behaved before this milestone in Brazilian history. It seeks to understand for what reason federalism that benefited the State of São Paulo and his collapse affected his independence from other states achieved by the end of the Empire and Republic Day. Related to this central problem, three questions are appended: What is the reason Washington Luís have chosen a paulista candidate for his succession? He was acting as institutional norms of the period or your choice was precipitated, causing the acceleration of the decline of the system process? How to react to the political elite of São Paulo with this choice, both before and after the revolution? For this, the method of situational analysis is used. Through modeling of Brazilian society, observes the actions of individual actors in this moment of institutional crisis, to finally understand the motivations that contributed to the dissolution of the First Republic.