O problema da verdade na filosofia de L. Wittgenstein: percurso da semântica à pragmática
Resumo
This study aims to examine the problem of truth as it presents itself in L.
Wittgenstein's philosophy. Problem this, which will be presented not isolated from
discussions on the truth raised in the history of philosophy, but within a broader
context of the theories of truth in their projects. Thus, the work will develop in the
following way: in the first chapter will be addressed various theories of truth, without
any judgment of value to be raised as their projects (it is a chapter whose function is
strictly descriptive). In the second chapter, will be presented the philosophy of the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) of Wittgenstein, specifically, with regard to the
interest of this study, namely, the conception of truth as correspondence (Truth and
Figuration) - with this chapter, claims to identify the discussion on the truth in
Wittgenstein with a broader project of truth. In the third chapter, will be addressed to
the philosophy of Philosophical Investigations (1945) as a radical contrast to the
tractatian vision of the problem of truth, where the author explains his criticism of
traditional concepts of the meaning in favor of a pragmatic use of the language. It is
expected with this chapter to establish a link between the Tractatus and
Philosophical Investigations, or rather indicates possible errors which Wittgenstein
himself would have found in Tractatus, mistakes that would justify the changes of
direction of the first to the second work. What Wittgenstein proposed from
Philosophical Investigations is a new method to avoid conceptual confusions, and the
emphasis will no longer be in the search for the essence of language or the logical
way of proposition, but in the use we make of language in our daily practices