A teoria da sensação no De anima de Aristóteles: a apreensão dos sensíveis próprios e comuns

Abstract

According to Aristotle, sensation is a process in which the sense becomes similar to the sensible. In order to explain this transition from dissimilarity to similarity it is required that one grasps that sensation is a kind of alteration. It is an affection which can be better described as preservation of what is potential (the sense) by what is actual (the sensible). In order to do so, the sense must be constituted in a similar manner in respect of the intermediary which needs to be between the sense and the sensible. So construed, the affection that explains sensation introduces two main characteristics: it establishes a threshold for the intensity of the sensible and it sets how the sense-organs should be composed. They must grasp the sensible without causing the destruction of the senses potentiality, since the intermediary is always something that enables the sensible to appear through it. Sensation as an affection explains primarily the affection of one of the sense objects, namely, the proper sensible. So, it stands as a difficulty how another kind of sense object is grasped: the common sensible. The senses are not physiologically constituted to perceive the common sensible. It happens that common sensibles accompany the proper sensibles, so there is a specific capacity to perceive them, and this capacity is shared by all five senses.