Ambiente institucional e organização de redes de franquias: uma comparação entre Brasil e França.
Abstract
Franchise companies deal with a classical dilemma: how to reconcile the gains from the
expansion of franchising with the potential cost of the brand name misuse by
franchisees. This dissertation analysis this question under the institutional background,
which differs from one country to another. It intends to explore the role of the formal
and informal rules of the game according to NORTH (1990) terminology to
institutional environment on the organizational design of franchise companies. To
deal with the potential hazards regarding misuse of the valuable asset in a franchise
contract, i.e., brand name (RUBIN, 1978), franchise companies should be able to
conciliate a better alignment between incentives by franchisees and franchisors to a
higher control over franchisees local actions under quality standards. This statement
should induce vertical efforts by franchise companies, in terms of interfirm contractual
arrangements in both distribution and supply chain management. More than substitutes,
these efforts are expected to be complementary. The way that these efforts are
combined, however, depends on the rules of the gaime that the companies are
embedded, regarding to law (formal rules), as well as culture, social codes, and
consumption standards (informal norms) of each coutry. This dissertation presents a
comparative analysis of Brazilian and French food franchising. Besides their economic
and historical relevance in the international franchising, Brazil and France are
embedded in particulars rules of the game, allowing for the discrimination of different
institutional environments effect on the franchise companies organization. Based on a
standardization interview agenda custom-made for this study, ten cases are addressed.
The main empirical results show the complementarities of the vertical efforts and the
role of institutional arrangements in the management and control models of brand name
value.