O Estado como liberdade e vida ética realizadas em Hegel

Abstract

The present thesis defends that freedom (Freiheit) in the philosophical thought of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), as presented in the “third part” of Philosophy of Law (1821), only concretizes in the State (Staat). Although he recognizes that particularity is a mark of the superiority of the modern world in relation to the ancient world, Hegel is aware of the risks of its reduction to property (Eigentum). In the Philosophy of Law, this reduction to needs (Bedürfnisse), corresponds to the moment of bourgeois civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), characterized as “loss” (Verlust) of family ethics (Familie), which, as moments of Ethics (Sittlichkeit), are suppressed (aufheben) by the State. Thus, although he recognizes that freedom in the modern world, also presupposes the right to property and the satisfaction of particular needs, Hegel, in the “third part” of the Philosophy of Law, the ethical organicity of youth writings and understands that only through institutional mediation (Vermittlung) that has its consummation in the State, individual freedom is realized. Thus, it concludes that only the State, as an effective reality (Wirklichkeit), is able to recognize the particular will and elevate it to universality, by enabling the individual to have concrete freedom and, in this way, an ethical life (Leben sittliches) realized.