O problema da verdade na filosofia de L. Wittgenstein: percurso da semântica à pragmática

Abstract

This study aims to examine the problem of truth as it presents itself in L. Wittgenstein's philosophy. Problem this, which will be presented not isolated from discussions on the truth raised in the history of philosophy, but within a broader context of the theories of truth in their projects. Thus, the work will develop in the following way: in the first chapter will be addressed various theories of truth, without any judgment of value to be raised as their projects (it is a chapter whose function is strictly descriptive). In the second chapter, will be presented the philosophy of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) of Wittgenstein, specifically, with regard to the interest of this study, namely, the conception of truth as correspondence (Truth and Figuration) - with this chapter, claims to identify the discussion on the truth in Wittgenstein with a broader project of truth. In the third chapter, will be addressed to the philosophy of Philosophical Investigations (1945) as a radical contrast to the tractatian vision of the problem of truth, where the author explains his criticism of traditional concepts of the meaning in favor of a pragmatic use of the language. It is expected with this chapter to establish a link between the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, or rather indicates possible errors which Wittgenstein himself would have found in Tractatus, mistakes that would justify the changes of direction of the first to the second work. What Wittgenstein proposed from Philosophical Investigations is a new method to avoid conceptual confusions, and the emphasis will no longer be in the search for the essence of language or the logical way of proposition, but in the use we make of language in our daily practices