Percepção e memória em Bergson: um questionamento acerca das críticas sartrianas à Matéria e memória

Abstract

Important philosopher and researcher of the twentieth century, Henri Bergson has gained prominence not only for his detailed analysis of consciousness and for the new meaning given to already established philosophical terms, but also for his addressing of the notion of duration, which is present in his major works and is the basis many for many of his conceptions. Bergson's philosophical writings have earned him much admiration and, at the same time, many critcisms, which, as they raise questions concerning fundamental points of the bergsonian philosophy, allow discussions that result in several studies. Among the most prominent criticisms, some are concentrated in the text of the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, entitled The Imagination, which addresses important aspects of the work Matter and memory. However, Sartre s criticisms seem to address Bergson s arguments in an one-sided way. Given this, our objective is to analyze the bergsonian reflections presented in Matter and memory trying to show that Sartre's positions regarding to Bergson were taken in a superficial way, which leads us to assert that Bergson's philosophy has not, as claimed by the author of The imagination, failed in his conceptions. For that, we will emphasize two fundamental notions present in Matter and memory, which were widely criticized by Sartre, namely the notions of perception and consciousness, as well as the conclusions presented in the finalization of the work about the dualism of body and spirit.