Fundamentação da filosofia na crítica da razão pura: regras metodológicas
Vieira, Marcelo Aparecido
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This dissertation proposes to investigate the method of the Critique of pure reason itself, as it is presented in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, for the substantiation of philosophy as science. It is Kantian thesis, from the pre-critical to the critical period, that philosophy is not yet given or constituted as science, being only an idea of a possible science; if philosophy is not yet given, one of the main tasks of the Critique of Pure Reason is to propose a systematic or integral substantiation of philosophy as science. The problem that this Dissertation seeks to investigate is the method that the Critique of Pure Reason itself adopts to accomplish this task. Two readings, divergent from each other, allow us to better understand the problem proposed here and the solution we seek to give to it. Schelling objects that Kant, by refusing a doctrine of construction for philosophy itself, would not be able to ground it. Gérard Lebrun, on the other hand, proposes that the foundation of philosophy proposed by Kant is not to be found in formal logic, as the leading thread of critical investigation, but in reflection itself as the method of philosophy. Against these two readings, this dissertation seeks to show that the foundation of philosophy proposed by Kant is found precisely in the critical method as set forth in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason. Our hypothesis is that the grounding required by criticism is possible not by the construction of concepts nor by pre-logical reflection, but by reason of the methodological rules as grounded in our faculties of knowledge and extracted from the forms of thinking itself. Which in the last analysis is: thinking by rules.
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