O Método de Prova na Crítica da Razão Pura: o problema da síntese por meros conceitos

Abstract

In the Transcendental Doctrine of the Method of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant characterizes the method of proof he employed in Transcendental Analytics as a transcendental method of synthesis by mere concepts. It is difficult to understand how a synthesis by concepts is possible, as Kant states at various points in the Critique that all synthetic knowledge requires reference to intuition, as is the case with the mathematical method of constructing concepts. This problem had repercussions on German Idealism, so that both Schelling and Fichte argue that Kant, by excluding intuition from the proof method of philosophy, ends up restricting it to the analysis and decomposition of concepts, such as the method of dogmatic metaphysics. However we intend to show that the proof method of the Critique of Pure Reason differs from dogmatism as this method is composed of two steps that go beyond the mere empty conceptual analysis. The first stage is found in the Analysis of Concepts, it is the transcendental deduction that aims to prove the objective validity of the categories; this stage has the essential role of not allowing philosophy, in its tests, to grope among mere empty concepts of objects, even without having any intuition. The second stage lies in proving the principles of understanding the Analytics of Principles; this stage aims to establish synthetic principles a priori, in a synthesis that has as its guiding thread not pure intuition, but possible experience. The present research, in opposition to the reading that Kant would have proposed a method of analytical proof for philosophy, intends to defend that the Critique of Pure Reason proposes in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Method and apply in the Transcendental Analytics a method of discursive synthesis. To this end, we also consider it necessary to investigate part of Kant's pre-critical period.