Consciência de si e sentido interno: da identidade e da duração da consciência na crítica da razão pura
Dutra, Elias Sergio
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the problem of the consciousness in the Critique of pure reason, specially the concept of consciousness of the Self, and the determination of the internal sense through consciousness. We will follow Kant s indication that there is a clear distinction of the knowing subject in a passive and an active dimension we believe that this distinction does not convert the knowing subject into a being possessing two different and irreconciliable parts. Opposing to this view, we want to, defend that Kant s distinction concerns two ways, the objective and the subjective dimensions, of considering the knowing subject. At first, we will analyze the subjective passive dimension; here we underscore the internal sense and his pure form, time, along with the difficulties that come from the interpretations about the internal sense in Kant. Secondly, we discuss the objective dimension of the knowledge; we given attention here to Kant s conception of Self-consciousness and Consciousness. In this part, we consider the necessary concepts for comprehending this issue, in particular, the concept of Transcendental Apperception, the I thin. We take into account the numerical identity of the consciousness and Kant s analysis of the Self-consciousness. Finally, in the third part, we focus on the issue of how the understanding as a self-consciousness determines the internal sense. This point, as we intend to show, requires a close examination of the transcendental synthesis of imagination and its implication to the comprehension of the different modes of the internal sense. This analysis, we believe, shows that the subject, in Kant s philosophy, far from being characterized by a duplicity of parts or faculties of an real or concrete subject, is only one and the same subject considered in its double dimension: the subjective and the objective sides concerning the same subject, that is, two distinct acts from the same consciousness, which is the self-consciousness.