CPMF: vida e morte de um programa governamental

Abstract

This study aims to seek complementary variables to the analysis of the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature concerning the Brazilian decision making process, under the approach of presidential success and failure, starting from the assumption that the institutional bases of the coalition presidentialism, well stablished by the Brazilian political science, are necessary but not sufficient to explain the operation of its political system. The evidences of such insufficiency come from the analysis of an explicit presidential failure suffered by president Lula – the end of the Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions – by sustaining that conflict and cooperation don’t only rely upon the distribution of decisional assets among the relevant actors to the decision-making process, but also on the bargain protocols, the bicameral dynamics, the content of the discussed propositions – and, in this case, the confluence of agendas that stablish some kind of intersection in relation to the one in study – and the decision-making environment, based on the path dependece of these policies.