Entre o liberalismo e o dirigismo democrático: a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1946 e a gênese constitucional do desenvolvimentismo brasileiro

Abstract

This thesis examines the formation of the economic order in the Brazilian Constitution of 1946 through an analysis of the political and institutional dynamics of the National Constituent Assembly. It argues that the 1946 Constitution cannot be adequately understood through traditional dichotomous classification, such as liberal restoration versus authoritarian interventionist continuity, and should instead be interpreted as the outcome of a complex constitutional decision produced under conditions of structural conflict, political pluralism, and the need for democratic stabilization. The research adopts an analytical framework that combines constitutional theory, institutional analysis, and normative examination, shifting the focus from the constitutional text in isolation to the institutional mediations that filtered ideas, interests, and economic projects during the constituent process. It demonstrates that the constitutionalization of the economic order did not result from an arbitrary ideological choice, but from the historical recognition of the insufficiency of market mechanisms to address the structural challenges of Brazilian development. The dissertation contends that the 1946 The Constitution consolidated and legitimized state intervention and economic planning without abandoning the market economy or political freedoms. Normative ambiguity is interpreted as a deliberate constitutional technique for deferring and managing conflict, allowing the coexistence of competing projects within a single legal framework and contributing to democratic stability.